



**HM Revenue  
& Customs**

# **Does Threatening ‘Prospective Retrospection’ of Anti-Avoidance Measures Work in Deterring Tax Avoidance on Employee Remuneration?**

**Evaluation of anti-avoidance**

**using difference-in-difference estimation**

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# Outline

- The Avoidance Problem
- The Anti-Avoidance Measure
- Evaluation Objective & Approach
- Differences-in-Differences Methodology
- The Data
- The Model
- Results
- Pre-programme test
- Qualitative analysis
- Lessons


# The avoidance problem

Bonus should be paid as employment income


But incentive to pay bonuses as dividends:

Tax rate for:	Bonus Paid as...	
	Employment Income	Dividend Income
Income Tax	40%	25%
Employer NICs	12.8%	0%
Employee NICs	1%	0%
Effective tax rate	54%	25%

# The policy response 1



## The policy response 2



# Evaluation objective & approach

What does success mean in practice?

- Avoidance disclosures? - already fallen away
- Revenues did not flow into a specific pot or come with a specific tag
- Only 0.1% of overall employment receipts, cannot be detected in aggregate data
- Change in form of remuneration and effective tax rate on individuals previously involved in avoidance. Detect these changes in individual-level data?

# Differences-in-Differences method


	Average before Treatment	Average after Treatment	Difference <i>Within Groups Over time</i> :
Treatment Group	$\text{Before}_{\text{Treatment}}$	$\text{After}_{\text{Treatment}}$	$\text{After}_{\text{Treatment}} - \text{Before}_{\text{Treatment}}$
Control Group	$\text{Before}_{\text{Control}}$	$\text{After}_{\text{Control}}$	$\text{After}_{\text{Control}} - \text{Before}_{\text{Control}}$
<b>Difference-in-Differences = difference <i>between Treatment and Control groups over time</i></b>			$(\text{After}_{\text{Treatment}} - \text{Before}_{\text{Treatment}}) - (\text{After}_{\text{Control}} - \text{Before}_{\text{Control}})$

## Differences-in-Differences 2


	ETR Before Treatment (April 2004)	ETR After Treatment (April 2005)	Difference <i>Within Groups Over time</i> :
Treatment Group: Avoiders	39%	45%	6 percentage points
Control: Non-Avoiders	31%	33%	2 percentage points
<b>Difference-in-Differences:</b>			<b>4 percentage points</b>



# The data: before the announcement



# The data: after the announcement




## Data: Average effective tax rates

Year	Average (Mean) Effective Tax Rate		
	Non-Avoider	Avoider	Positive-Dividend Avoider
2001-02	30.6%	39.0%	37.7%
2002-03	31.1%	40.2%	38.8%
2003-04	30.4%	42.3%	42.4%
2004-05	30.8%	43.3%	44.4%
2005-06	28.9%	44.0%	44.4%

# Model I Basic D-i-D

- Simple ordinary least squares regression



## Model II Subgroup Specific effects

- Estimate sub-group effects for avoiders with positive dividend income

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 D_i^1 + \gamma_1 \text{after} + \delta_1 D_i^1 * \text{after} \\ + \beta_2 D_i^1 D_i^2 + \gamma_2 \text{after} * D_i^2 + \delta_2 D_i^1 D_i^2 * \text{after} \\ + \gamma_3 X + \varepsilon_i$$

Interact treatment dummy for positive dividends subgroup ( $D^2$ ) with:


- treatment dummy for avoider subgroup ( $D^2$ )
- the after indicator
- the interaction term to pick up the subgroup specific treatment effect

- Sub-group treatment effect is:  $[\delta_1 + \delta_2]$


# Summary of regression results

Estimated percentage point (ppt) increase in:	2004-05		2005-06	
	Avoider [ $\delta_1$ ]	Positive Dividends Avoiders [ $\delta_1 + \delta_2$ ]	Avoider [ $\delta_1$ ]	Positive Dividends Avoiders [ $\delta_1 + \delta_2$ ]
Effective tax rate	0	<b>5.6</b>	2.8	<b>5.5</b>
% dividend income	3.4	-11.4	3.5	-12.4
% employment income	-4.2	14.3	0	15.1

# Pre-programme Test



# Pre-programme Test



- Failed pre-programme test for 2003-04: positive dividend avoiders increased ETR by 4.9 percentage points
- Model using '**Random Growth Model**'



# Qualitative analysis

- 50 complex taxpayers, 7 known employer avoiders:
- 34 had some change in avoidance:
  - 3 started to avoid
  - 15 changed avoidance scheme
  - 16 stopped avoiding
- Ending some employer- & individual-based avoidance
  - Yield may be greater than found in quant analysis
- Switching from employer- to individual-based avoidance
  - Switch in risk, lose economies of scale
- Some on-going individual based avoidance
  - Areas for future action

# Lessons learned

## Policy

1. Policy worked – 5ppt increase in effective tax rates
2. Raised most of forecast yield
3. Understanding elements not working well, to inform future policy
4. Success of threat of retrospection?

## Analysis

5. Data cleansing and matching for future use
6. Developed our in-house econometric skills
7. Combining data, institutional knowledge & analysis to refine as we went along
8. New model for technical support from consultants